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Highlights1
- Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) has proven to be a useful tool to support the eco-
nomic appraisal of important projects in many sectors. In the energy domain, 
a single CBA method has been proposed at EU level to evaluate and compare 
electricity transmission and storage projects from different countries, which is 
unprecedented anywhere in the world. 
- The objective of the 10th report of THINK has been to advise the European 
Commission (DG Energy) on the development of this method in the context 
of the Energy Infrastructure Package. This brief is derived from that report. 
We provide recommendations for the scope of the analysis as well as the cal-
culation of the net benefit. We also discuss how the method can be used to 
rank projects.
- Regarding the scope of the analysis, our recommendations are: (1) interaction 
between projects must be taken into account in the project and baseline defi-
nition; (2) data consistency and quality should be ensured; (3) the convention-
al time horizon is 20-25 years; (4) CBA should concentrate on a reduced list of 
effects and those should be monetized; and (5) distributional concerns should 
not be addressed in the calculation of net benefits.
- Regarding the calculation of the net benefit, our recommendations are: (6) in-
frastructure costs need to be disaggregated; (7) the model used to monetize 
the production cost savings and gross consumer surplus needs to be explicitly 
stated; (8) a common discount factor should be used for all projects; and (9) a 
stochastic approach that is consistent with the Energy Roadmap 2050 should 
be used to address uncertainty.
- Regarding the ranking of projects, our recommendation is: (10) the ranking 
should be primarily based on the monetized net benefit.
- ENTSO-E has already proposed a draft method for electricity projects. We 
will analyse to what extent this method is in line with our recommendations 
and will conclude that it is an important step in the right direction. However, 
improvements could still be made, as proposed in this brief.
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Introduction
The European Commission estimates that about €200 billion 
needs to be invested in electricity and gas infrastructure in or-
der to achieve the 2020 energy and climate objectives. There is a 
risk that almost half of this expected investment will be too late 
or not at all. The aim of the Energy Infrastructure Package is 
therefore to accelerate the development of selected projects by: 
(1) facilitating their permit granting process; (2) providing an 
enhanced regulatory treatment for these projects; and (3) pro-
viding EU financing assistance for the selected projects that are 
important to achieve the EU energy objectives, but which are 
not commercially viable.
The Energy Infrastructure Package has established a process to 
identify Projects of Common Interest (PCIs) in priority cor-
ridors and areas2. First, promoters nominate their projects to 
the Regional Groups which will be set up for each corridor or 
area. Member states and the European Commission will then 
rank the proposed projects in each Regional Group based on 
individual Cost Benefit Analyses (CBA). Finally, the European 
Comission will adopt an EU-wide list of projects based on the 
regional lists. 
The Energy Infrastructure Package has also introduced a pro-
cedure to develop a CBA method for electricity and gas which 
promoters will be required to use when they nominate their 
projects. The ENTSOs are expected to propose a method, and 
ACER, the European Commission and member states will pro-
vide opinions on these methods. The ENTSOs will then review 
the method and finally the European Commission will then ap-
prove it. ENTSO-E has already proposed a draft CBA method in 
anticipation of this procedure.
In this Policy Brief, we will focus on electricity (i.e. transmis-
sion lines and storage). We will provide recommendations for 
the scope of the analysis as well as the calculation of the net ben-
efit of electricity transmission and storage projects. We will also 
discuss to what extent the ENTSO-E proposal is in line with our 
recommendations. We will recommend how the method should 
be used to rank projects, but do not discuss the other uses that 
have been foreseen for the CBA method in the Energy Infra-
structure Package (i.e. cost allocation and regulatory incentives 
for infrastructure investments).
2. The priority electricity corridors include Northern Sea offshore grid, North-
South electricity interconnections in Western Europe, North-South electricity 
interconnections in Central Eastern and South Eastern Europe, and the Baltic 
Energy Market Interconnection Plan in electricity. 
Cost benefit analysis
We first define the scope of the analysis, to then discuss how 
the net benefit of transmission and storage projects should be 
calculated in the context of the Energy Infrastructure Package.
Scope of the analysis
Project & baseline definition
The purpose of CBA is to evaluate the economic effects of add-
ing a project to a forecasted future, i.e. the so-called baseline. 
Therefore, scoping the analysis starts with the definition of the 
project and the definition of the baseline.
1. Interaction between projects must be taken into 
account in the project and baseline definition
In network industries, projects typically interact, i.e. they can 
be (1) complementary, or (2) competitive. Complementary pro-
jects should be dealt with in the definition of projects, i.e. they 
should be considered as a single project. Competitive projects 
should be dealt with in the definition of the baseline. Each pro-
ject should be evaluated against two baselines (one with and 
one without all proposed projects) to detect competing projects. 
The ENTSO-E proposal ensures that only projects that signifi-
cantly contribute to the common goal of increasing the capac-
ity on a certain border can be grouped. However, the objective 
should be to group together projects which are complementary 
in terms of their net benefit, i.e. the net benefit of both projects 
together is higher than the sum of the net benefit of the indi-
vidual projects. Project promoters should be made responsible 
for providing evidence on the complementarities between in-
vestments that are proposed as a single project.
2. Data consistency and quality should be ensured
A public consultation is a good way to ensure the quality of the 
data that will be used in the baseline. ENTSO-E has already 
proposed such a consultation to validate the data, following the 
current practice in the context of the Ten Year Network Devel-
opment Plan. It is also important to ensure the consistency of 
the scenarios with the Energy Roadmap 2050, which we will 
discuss along with the calculation of the net benefit.
3. Conventional time horizon is 20-25 years
There is a trade-off between capturing longer-term effects and 
increased uncertainty. The ENTSO-E proposal is already in line 
with the convential time horizon.
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Effect mapping
The economic effects of developing electricity transmission or 
storage projects include (1) the impact on the power system, as 
well as the effects beyond the system, i.e. (2) externalities and 
(3) macroeconomic effects. The impact on the power system can 
be categorised into production versus consumption effects, in-
frastructure costs and other market benefits, such as improved 
competition and liquidity. The externalities are related to the 
impact of these projects on greenhouse gas emissions, renew-
able energy, local environmental and social costs, and the early 
deployment of innovative transmission or storage technologies 
(Box 1).
4. CBA should concentrate on a reduced list of effects 
and those should be monetized
There are several effects that can be disregarded for different 
reasons: (1) macroeconomic effects, such as economic growth 
and employment effects, are relatively similar for most projects 
so they will not significantly affect their ranking; (2) infrastruc-
ture investments can result in a more efficient dispatch of power 
plants so that greenhouse gas emissions are reduced. However 
there is a carbon price so this effect has been internalised in the 
production cost savings; (3) infrastructure investments can also 
reduce the spilling of renewable energy, which will reduce the 
renewable energy capacity that needs to be installed to achieve 
the 2020 renewable energy target. In other words, considering 
greenhouse gas emissions and renewable energy as a seperate 
effect would imply double counting.
There are also effects that can be dismissed for most projects, 
with exceptions: (1) infrastructure costs include local environ-
mental and social costs because promotors have to do an en-
vironmental impact assessment and take measures to fullfill 
certain requirements, although the visual impact of a project 
for instance is not yet covered by these regulations; (2) early 
deployment benefits have also already been internalised in the 
infrastructure costs as there are several EU programs to support 
innovative infrastructure projects, although there can of course 
be exceptions in innovative projects that have received relatively 
limited support; (3) other market benefits are relatively similar 
for most projects and are usually very small compared to other 
relevant effects. Exceptions could be projects that significantly 
change the market structure in an isolated area.
To sum up, there remain three effects that should be monetized 
for all projects, i.e. (1) infrastructure costs, (2) production cost 
savings and (3) gross consumer surplus. There are additional 
effects which may be relevant to specific projects and indica-
tors should be used to identify these projects and to justify ad-
ditional analysis to monetize also these effects. This can be the 
case for projects with an exceptional visual impact (e.g. projects 
in densely populated, protected or tourist areas) or for projects 
that significantly change the structure of a market (e.g. projects 
in isolated areas) or for projects that are exceptionally innova-
tive (e.g. first of a kind projects, such as offshore infrastruc-
tures).
The ENTSO-E draft proposal lists seven benefits to be consid-
ered for all projects. A distinction is made between effects that 
are to be monetized, i.e. “social-economic welfare” and “varia-
Box 1: Comprehensive list of effects (own depiction)
4Policy Brief 2013/02
Florence School of Regulation
tion in losses”, and effects that are to be quantified as additional 
indicators, i.e. “improved security of supply, RES integration, 
Variation in CO2 emissions, Technical resilience/system safety and 
flexibility”. If projects are then ranked based on the monetized 
net benefit in combination with these indicators, it implies an 
implicit monetization of effects that have not been monetized 
explicitly. Such an implicit approach is less transparent and al-
lows for subjective judgment.
Distributional effects
5. Distributional concerns should not be addressed in 
the calculation of net benefits
The economic analysis of efficiency gains from infrastructure 
projects should be done without consideration of distributional 
effects. If there are concerns, they should be resolved with ex-
plicit political decisions by relevant authorities. The European 
Commission could for instance use regional quotas when defin-
ing the EU-wide list based on the regional lists.
The ENTSO-E draft proposal does not explicitly discuss dis-
tributional effects, but it does refer to the EU Regional Policy 
Guide. The guide proposes the use of social discount rates, 
which implies that the rates of developing countries are higher 
because they have a higher economic growth outlook. As a re-
sult, the projects of these countries will be ranked lower than 
projects with similar benefits in developed countries, which ex-
acerbates distributional concerns. Below, we argue in favor of 
using a common discount factor for all projects.
Calculation of the net benefit
Monetization 
6. Infrastructure costs need to be disaggregated
There should be a predefined list of cost components that pro-
moters are required to report separately. The list of items pro-
posed by ENTSO-E can be the starting point, but the costs 
incurred for mitigating environmental or social impact of the 
project should also be presented separately and included in the 
total project expenditure.
7. The model used to monetize the production cost 
savings and gross consumer surplus needs to be 
explicitly stated
There is no single model that adequately captures all the pro-
duction cost savings and gross consumer surplus of all trans-
mission and storage projects. It is therefore important that the 
assumptions of the model are clearly explained to allow for 
a proper interpretation of the CBA results. The choice of the 
model should also be coordinated with the data validation pro-
cess of the baseline.
The draft ENTSO-E proposal leaves certain modeling choices to 
the Regional Groups, while also providing some model specifi-
cations.
ENTSO-E has proposed a minimum consideration of technical 
characteristics of power plants (“efficiency rate and CO2 emis-
sion rate”) and a minimum geographic scope (“all member states 
and third countries on whose territory the project shall be built, 
all directly neighbouring member states and all other member 
states impacted by the project”). Note that Regional Groups may 
choose a sophisticated model, for instance including more de-
tailed technical characteristics of power plants. It will therefore 
be important to coordinate these modelling choices with the 
data validation process for the baseline.
ENTSO-E has also proposed an indicator to estimate the chang-
es in the volume of energy non-served during contingency pe-
riods i.e. “security of supply”. ENTSO-E referred to the lack of 
reliable data across Europe as the reason not to monetize this 
effect. The CEER has already provided guidelines on how these 
values should be established at a national level, and an interme-
diate solution could be that a value is agreed upon as part of the 
data validation process for the baseline. 
Inter-temporal discounting of costs and benefits
8. A common discount factor should be used for all 
projects
Projects of Common Interest will have a similar regulatory 
treatment and might also be eligible for EU financial support. 
The label can also improve the confidence of potential inves-
tors and thereby facilitate access to capital. These projects are 
therefore likely to have similar access to capital so that a com-
mon discount factor should be used for all projects. The fac-
tor should be agreed upon through open consultation, together 
with the parameters of the baseline. 
The ENTSO-E draft proposal is partially in line with this rec-
ommendation because there is a single discount rate for every 
region. However, ENTSO-E also proposes to follow the EU Re-
gional Policy Guide, which would exacerbate possible distribu-
tion concerns across regions. 
Uncertainty
9. A stochastic approach that is consistent with the 
Energy Roadmap 2050 should be used to address 
uncertainty
The Energy Roadmap 2050 already provides possible extreme 
scenarios for the future that are consistent with the EU energy 
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and climate objectives. Based on these scenarios, a stochastic 
approach should be followed to capture the robustness of pro-
jects across these possible futures, which would result in a net 
benefit distribution.
The ENTSO-E draft proposal already refers to the use of mul-
tiple scenarios and the use of sensitivity analysis, but not yet 
a stochastic approach. Nevertheless, it has already been imple-
mented by several TSOs in Europe for electricity infrastructure 
projects. We argue that this approach should be adopted at EU 
level and be consistent with the scenarios of the Energy Road-
map 2050.
Ranking projects
10. The ranking should be primarily based on the  
monetized net benefit
The method we recommend above is a stochastic approach 
that calculates a net benefit distribution against two baselines, 
i.e. one with and one without all proposed projects. However, 
to rank projects we need a single monetized value. This value 
could be obtained by taking the mean value of the net benefit 
distribution of a project against one of the baselines, but adjust-
ments might then be needed for (1) competitive projects and 
(2) uncertainty.
The first issue is with competitive projects. If the ENTSO-E 
draft proposal were to be followed, the initial ranking would 
be based on the baseline with all proposed projects included. If 
two competitve projects are proposed and ranked against this 
baseline, they will be ranked low and both could even exhibit 
a negative net benefit, even if developing one of them could be 
strongly beneficial. To identify these kinds of cases, the base-
line without the proposed projects could be used. However, if 
the ranking were based on the baseline excluding all other pro-
posed projects, we would have the opposite problem. Competi-
tive projects would both be ranked high, even in cases where it 
is only beneficial to develop one of them. In other words, there 
is no perfect baseline and adjustments to the initial ranking may 
be needed regardless for competitive projects.
The second issue is one of uncertainty. Even though the initial 
ranking is based on the mean value of the net benefit distribu-
tion of projects, policy makers (depending on their risk averse-
ness) might wish to adjust the ranking of projects which exhibit 
a significantly different risk profile to the average project.
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Conclusion
The draft method proposed by ENTSO-E is an important step in 
the right direction, however improvements could still be made, 
as proposed in this brief. It should also be considered a suc-
cess in itself that a single CBA method has been proposed at EU 
level to evaluate and compare electricity transmission and stor-
age projects from different countries as this is unprecedented 
anywhere in the world.
